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This paper analyzes the cultural evolution of firms and workers. Following 
an imitation rule, each firm and worker decides whether to be innovative (or 
not) and skilled (or unskilled). We apply evolutionary game theory to find 
the system of replicator dynamics, and characterize the low-level and high-
level equilibria as Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) “against the field.” 
Hence, we study how a persistent state of underdevelopment can arise in 
strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than rational 
maximizers. We show that when the current state of the economy is in the 
basin of attraction of the poverty trap, players should play against the field if 
they want to change their status quo. The threshold level to overcome the 
poverty trap can be lowered if there is an appropriate policy using income 
taxes, education costs and skill premia. Hence, we study the replicator 
dynamics with a subsidy and payoff taxation to overcome the poverty trap. 
 
Keywords:  Imitative behavior, conformism, poverty traps, skill premium, 
strategic complementarities. 
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En este trabajo se analiza la evolución cultural de trabajadores y firmas, 
como determinante de la evolución social de una economía dada. Siguiendo 
una conducta imitativa firmas y trabajadores optan por ser calificados (o no) 
o ser innovadores (o no). Las reglas implícitas en este proceso son 
modeladas mediante un sistema dinámico cuyas soluciones, dependiendo de 
condiciones iniciales, son las que determinan qué imitar y definen la 
evolución futura de la sociedad. Dicha evolución puede conducir a un 
equilibrio bajo y por una senda de bajo crecimiento, donde los trabajadores 
prefieren no ser calificados y las firmas, no ser innovadoras; o a un equilibrio 
alto, donde puede coexistir un porcentaje alto de trabajadores calificados y 
firmas innovadoras con un porcentaje de trabajadores no calificados y firmas 
no innovadoras. La senda que se transite depende de las condiciones iniciales 
existentes en la economía. El primero de los equilibrios es una trampa de 
pobreza, que aparece como un atractor local del sistema dinámico. Las 
trayectorias que definen la evolución, quedan identificadas por pares 
estratégicos sobre las mejores respuestas de las firmas y/o trabajadores en la 
elección del otro, conformando un proceso evolutivo de estrategias 
complementarias. Se introduce el concepto de estrategias evolutivamente 
estables (ESS) contra el campo, para analizar la persistencia de determinadas 
respuestas ante modificaciones en las condiciones estructurales de la 
economía. Finalmente, se muestra el papel del planificador central para 
ubicar a la economía en condiciones iniciales que la lleven, por sus propias 
leyes, a un equilibrio alto. 
 
Palabras Clave: Comportamiento imitativo, trampas de pobreza, estrategias 
complementarias, premios al desempeño. 





The notion of strategic complementarities is widely studied. It is well 
understood and accepted that the complementarity between R&D (innovative 
firms) and human capital accumulation (skilled workers) is an engine of 
economic growth (Lucas, 1988). Early research about the complementarity 
of R&D and human capital was carried out by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and 
Schultz (1975), who pointed out that the major role of education is to adapt, 
and to generate new technologies; that is, to adapt technological changes 
generated by innovative firms.  Redding (1996) formalized this idea using an 
R&D-based growth model developed by Aghion and Howitt (1999). He 
showed the existence of strategic complementarities between workers’ 
investment in education and firms’ investment in R&D, and then The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers 
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demonstrated how a development trap would result when both types of 
investment are inactive. More recent studies develop different models to 
prove that high-skilled labor and high-technology firms are complements; 
they require this proof in order to prove the existence of a high-level 
equilibrium, particularly see Acemoglu (1997, 1998). In fact, it is generally 
thought that new technologies reduce the demand for unskilled workers and 
increase the demand for skilled workers, since skilled workers adapt more 
easily to technological change.  This is the well-known notion of “Skill-
Biased Technological Change” which implies a shift in the production 
technology that favors skilled over unskilled labor by increasing skilled 
labor’s relative productivity and, therefore, its relative demand (see 
Acemoglu, 2002; Aghion, 2006; Hornstein et al., 2005). 
 
Moreover, a number of recent contributions have emphasized the role of skill 
resources as a crucial constraint on selecting the technological profile to 
implement in developing economies. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), for 
instance, consider that adopting investment-specific technical change 
requires specific human capital, physical capital, and an increase in skilled 
labor. Hendricks (2000) develops a model of growth through technology 
adoption focusing on the complementarities between technologies and skills. 
Workers’ skills and firms’ technological profiles are complementary because 
the level of available skills limits the profile of technologies firms can use, 
while the technological profile determines the rate of learning. Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994), by focusing on the role of human capital in economic 
development, suggest that human capital facilitates the adoption of 
technology from abroad and creates domestic technology. This evidence 
reinforces the importance of matching among the skills and the technological 
profile. There are two well known approaches. The first, more conventional, 
approach is the “Skill-biased Technological Change” approach (see papers 
by Berman et al. (1994) in the US, Haskel and Heden (1999) in the UK, and 
Machin and Van Reenen (1998) extend the approach to continental Europe) 
where the investments in R&D, new products, new processes, new 
technologies and even the ICT (Information and Communication 
Technologies) increase the firms’ demand for skilled workers, assuming 
firms and workers know how to implement the new technologies (see the 
“absorptive capacity” by Cohen and Levinthal (1990, 131) where “an 
organization’s absorptive capacity will depend on the absorptive capacities 
of its individual members”). Skilled labour is a necessary complement to 
R&D activities in reinforcing the absorptive capacity of a given firm and 
new technologies become more effective. The second theory supports the 
endogeneity of the phenomenon (referring to approaches that have 
complementarities), i.e., the endogenous skill-biased suggesting that skilled 
workers are responsible for inducing firms to invest in new technologies, see 




In this vein, this paper studies the strategic complementarities between R&D 
and Human Capital. But our approach is quite different from the above 
references, since we analyze the evolutionary dynamics with an evolutionary 
game theoretical approach. Evolutionary games introduce two new points of 
view in the classical approach given by the game theory of the economic 
problems. The first one is the introduction of the concept of Evolutionarily 
Stable Strategy (ESS) and the second one is the evolutionary dynamic. The 
first one was introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982 in his book Evolution 
and the Theory of Games. This concept, basically, is a refinement of the 
Nash Equilibrium (NE) concept, indicating the stability of a strategy as a 
best response. An evolutionarily stable strategy is a best response that 
continuous being a best response, even after perturbations of the original 
conditions, Taylor (1979). The second point of view that evolutionary game 
theory introduces, refers to the evolution of system modeled as a game, and 
here the understanding of evolution, in evolutionary game theory, is not the 
usual as in repeated games and/or differential games. The evolution in this 
theory is modeled by a dynamical system, whose equations are determined 
by the behavioral rules existing in a given time, and in a given system, 
biological, social or economic, that is being modeled as a game. So under 
this approach we can consider an economy as an evolutionary system, where 
the behavioral rules of the individuals determine the evolution of the 
economy. These rules are mathematically modeled by a dynamical system, 
and under additional hypothesis, the solutions of this system are 
evolutionarily stable strategies. Moreover, evolutionary game theory does 
not explain the evolution of the economy for individuals or agents that are 
completely rational or rational maximizers. 
 
Instead, evolutionary game theory takes into account that in some cases (in 
most of them) individuals do not act in a rational way, at least in the 
perspective of the economy as a whole trying to reach a social maximum 
benefit. Even, if the individuals understand that they need to do the best, at 
least for themselves, their end behavior, some times, leads the economy into 
a path of low economical performance or even caught in poverty trap. We 
know that standard growth theory teaches us that poverty traps are stable-
low level balanced growth paths to which economies gravitate due to 
adverse initial conditions or poor equilibrium selection. In other words, 
economies fail to generate sustained growth because they started poor, as 
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) mention due to low longevity or poor human 
capital, or else because they cannot invent better institutions that coordinate 
their investments successfully. Therefore, in this paper, we explain this 
pernicious form of coordination as one equilibrium of an evolutionary game 
characterized by complementarities between firms and workers. Hence, our 




“From the basic ideas of a standard growth model of human capital and 
R&D, what happens if we drop the assumption of rational maximizers agents 
(or rational expectations) and apply imitation rules (or imitative agents) 
instead?” 
 
Hence, we can analyze the dynamical stability of the solution of a dynamical 
system that represents the change in the behavior of the individuals, and at 
the same time the stability of this behavior is a strategy followed in the 
conflict. We find that the rationality of the economic agents, can be one of 
the main factors to maintain the economy in a path going to a low level of 
equilibrium, but in other cases this rationality can be an engine to overcome 
a situation of low performance, in particular a poverty trap. The role that 
rationality plays, depend on the initial conditions. 
 
Therefore, we analyze a two-population game as a matching process 
between the economic agents that are firms and workers. First, we assume 
that firms have two strategies, innovative or non-innovative, depending on 
whether they invest in R&D. Workers’ strategies are skilled or unskilled, 
depending on whether they invest in human capital or not. Wages are 
conditional on worker’s type but are exogenously fixed in the model. There 
are two pure Nash equilibria: innovative firms with high ability workers and 
non-innovative firms with low ability workers. We analyze the game in an 
evolutionary setting with random matching between firms and workers. We 
consider imitative behavioral rules as the mobilizing force behind cultural 
evolution, Matsuy (1996). In this vein, we assume that the probability that an 
agent (either a firm or a worker) will imitate a successful agent is based on 
two factors: first, the probability that an agent meets a more successful agent, 
and, second, the probability that the agent will be better off if they adopt the 
successful agent’s strategy, for more details refer to Apesteguia et al. (2007) 
and Schlag (1998, 1999). Therefore, we study an imitation game where the 
nature of interactions among agents creates a potential for multiple 
equilibria. These equilibria are characterized by different levels of “activity” 
(high-skilled workers, innovative firms) in the economy. A low-level 
equilibrium arises when non-innovative firm and low-skilled workers 
predominate. We show that when firms invest in R&D to become 
innovative, they are successful only in the presence of a sufficiently high 
number of high-skilled workers, following Redding (1996). At the same 
time, workers are only encouraged to improve their skills when a large 
number of firms invest in R&D. Conversely, firms that do not invest in R&D 
do not look for high-skilled workers, and therefore make the accumulation of 
skills unprofitable for workers. Hence, the distribution of the types of firms 
and workers changes over time. These changes can be understood as cultural Ensayos 
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evolution, where cultural evolution refers to changes in beliefs or behavior 
over time. 
 
We argue that, this research is relevant because it shows that imitation
1 can 
drive economies toward prosperity or poverty depending on initial 
conditions and on exogenous shocks. The model suggests that imitation 
determines a worker’s choice about education (or human capital 
accumulation) and a firm’s decision to invest in R&D. Moreover, the model 
shows that the market cannot solve the problem itself. But, by imputing 
agency to individuals, or by giving power to a government (central planner) 
we can overcome the problem and use either collective action or central 
planning to overcome an equilibrium and move to another. This work 
therefore reinforces other works on market failures, while showing that 
implementable solutions still exist. The crucial parameters that encourage 
firms and workers to adopt innovation and skills are education or training 
costs, skill premia and income taxes as policies to create incentives for 
investment in R&D. To model evolution we maintain the perspective of 
evolutionary game theory with its models characterized by the replicator 
dynamics. This perspective allows to relax the strong rationality assumptions 
characteristic of classical game theory and to capture explicitly the dynamics 
of the decision-making process. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the one-shot 
game. Section 2 presents the evolutionary game, stating the main definitions 
about evolutionarily stable strategies, population flows and the imitation rule 
to get the system of replicator dynamics. Subsection 2.3 studies the stability 
of the steady state using the replicator dynamics. Section 3 proposes how the 
poverty trap can be avoided when an agent faces the current economic 
environment, playing against the field. Subsection 3.1 analyzes the 
intervention of policy makers through an implementation of payoff taxation 
and subsidies to overcome the poverty trap. The last section concludes. 
 
 
1. The Game 
 
It is considered a model of two populations: workers, W, and firms, F, based 
on Accinelli et al. (2009). This is a normal form game with two-players: a 
worker and a firm. The potential worker decides whether to improve her 
skills or not. Though it seems initially counterintuitive to think that a skilled 
worker can become “unskilled,” a loss of skill could depend on the type of 
skills or knowledge under consideration and how the change is motivated. 
Hence, we refer to the decision of being on the “knowledge frontier.” We 
                                                 
1 As a driving force of cultural evolution. The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers 
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assume that a worker’s tendency, to be skilled or not, follows an imitation 
rule, this means that every worker knows other workers’ economic 
conditions, and having imitated a high-skilled individual, takes a training 
course with a 100 percent probability of being successful.
2 Then, the firm 
decides whether to invest in R&D or not. If a firm invests in R&D it 
becomes innovative, otherwise it is not. Such decisions may depend on the 
current state of the economy. Thus if the economy is composed mainly of 
workers and firms with low-profiles, then workers and firms decide not to 
invest in education and R&D departments. 
 
Hence, consistent with the literature, we consider an economy composed of 
two populations: workers, W and firms, F. Let us assume that each 
population is divided into two types: 
 
• Occasionally, the W-population divides into the S-type  that invests in 
improving their individual skills, who will be the skilled workers, and the 
NS-type corresponds to unskilled workers. 
 
• Occasionally, the F-population divides into the I-type that invests in R&D 
or are innovative firms, and the NI-type of non-innovative firms.  
 
The contractual period between types of firms and workers is described by 
the following characteristics: 
  
•  Asymmetric information. At the beginning of the contractual period, 
workers do not know the type of the firm that hired them. On the contrary, 
workers must certify their skill levels, for example they must show a CV, 
and therefore firms know the worker’s type. A worker enters a firm without 
understanding if the company invests in R&D or not, but if an innovative 
firm is successful, then the worker gets a premium. 
 
• Training costs and Investment costs. The worker has to pay an associated 
cost to become a high-skilled worker. That is, the S-type worker must invest 
in education by going to a training school, at an associated cost, CE. To 
become an innovative firm implies that the firm carries out investment in 
R&D departments at an associated cost, CI.
 
 
• Gross income. Let Bi (j) be the gross-benefit of the i-th firm hiring the j-th 
worker,  ∀  {} , , = NI I i   { } NS S j , = . For all firms, a S-type worker gets a 
salary   , and a NS-type worker gets a salary salary 0< S<  . 
 
                                                 
2 But, of course, entering a training course is not a guarantee to pass it and to find a skill-




3 The “skill premia hypothesis” assumes that innovative firms 
give premia to their workers at the end of the contractual period. Assume 
that the innovative firms, I, give premia to their workers, while NI-firms do 
not share these benefits.
4 Thus, skilled workers, S, receive a premium    and 
unskilled workers, NS, receive a premium p,   0       , when both types 
work for an innovative firm, I. 
 




• If a firm is innovative, the payoff to a skilled worker is greater than the 
payoff to an unskilled worker, i.e.,  > s pC E sp + −+ . 
 
• If a firm is non-innovative, then the payoff to an unskilled worker is at least 
as great as the payoff to a skilled worker, i.e.,  CE s s − ≥ . This means that if 
there are no rewards, then there are no incentives to be a skilled worker. 
 
• If a worker is skilled, then the payoffs obtained by an innovative firm are 
greater than those obtained by a non-innovative firm, i.e., 
() > () . IN I BS p B S −  
 
• If a worker is unskilled, then the benefits for a non-innovative firm are 
greater than those for an innovative firm, i.e.,  ) ( < ) ( NS B p NS B NI I − .  
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the two population normal form game.  
 
Table1 
Payoff Matrix of the Game 
W \ F  I NI 
S  ,( ) ( ) I s pC E BS s pC I +− − ++   ,( ) NI s CE B S s − −  
NS  ,() ( ) I s pB N S s p C I +− + +   ,( ) NI s BN Ss −  
                                                 
3Acemoglu (2003) provides a seminal contribution about skill premia. 
4Recall that workers do not know the type of contracting firm. So, at the beginning of the 
productive process each worker does not know if she is going to receive a premium or not; 
this information is revealed only at the end of the period, once she learns the contracting 
firm´s type. 
5Two references on strategic complementarities among types of firms and workers are: 1) 
Acemoglu (1999); when there is a sufficient fraction of workers who are skilled, firms find 
profitable to create jobs specifically targeted at this group, and as a result, unskilled wages 
fall and skilled wages increase. 2) Acemoglu (1998); as the economy accumulates more 
skills, technical change responds to make new technologies more complementary to 




The expected payoffs of the S-type and NS-type worker, given the 
probabilities of being hired by either the I-type or NI-type firms are E(S) and 
E(NS) defined as follows:  
 
[ ] () = () ( ) () E S prob I s p CE prob NI s CE +− + −   (1) 
 
[ ] () = ( ) () ( ) EN S p r o bI s p p r o bN I s ++   (2) 
 
Where  prob(I)  represents the worker’s probability of being hired by an 
innovative firm and prob(NI) the probability of being hired by a non-
innovative firm. Hence, workers prefer to be a S-type if E(S )> E(NS), and, 
conversely, they prefer to be a NS-type if E(NS) > E(S). Then, E(S) > E(NS) 










  (3) 
 











  (4) 
 
Let us denote a firm’s probability to employ a skilled worker by prob(S) and 
the probability to employ an unskilled worker by prob (NS). Hence, a firm 
prefers to be innovative if and only if the expected payoff of being 
innovative is greater than the expected payoff of being non-innovative, i.e., 





() ( ) ( ) ()
IN I
I I NI NI
BN S B N S pC I
prob S
B NS B S B S B NS p p
− −−
−+ − + −
  (5) 
 
Let us call  () = I prob I y  and  () =s prob S x . Therefore, the game has three 
Nash equilibria. Two in pure strategies: (I,S) and (NI,NS) and a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium given by  
 
() =, ( 1) ;, ( 1 ) ss II NE x x y y −−   (6) 
                                                 
6Note that, 0 
         
           1  holds due to the above assumptions of strategic 




Hence, a threshold level where both firms and workers prefer to be high-
profile (innovative and skilled) is above ( ) I s y x , . 
 
 
2. The Evolutionary Game 
 
A key concept in evolutionary game theory is the Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategy (ESS), for more details see Maynard Smith and Price (1973), 
Maynard Smith (1974, 1982) and Taylor (1979). An evolutionary stable 
strategy must have the property of noninvadability, that is, if almost every 
member of the population adheres to the (ESS), no mutant
7 can successfully 
invade. This concept is relevant only for monomorphic populations, but it 
can be extended to polymorphic populations. It corresponds to a stable state 
in which only pure strategies, or behaviors, can be played, but in which 
different players with different strategies can co-exist; such that, every 
change in the distribution of strategies implies a reduction in the expected 
value of fitness or welfare for the population as a whole. 
 
Originally, this concept was developed in the framework of a symmetric 
normal form game. In order to apply the (ESS) concept to asymmetric 
games, we can think of agents being randomly assigned, with equal 
probabilities, to be either player i  or player  . j The agents are informed of 
the role to which they have been assigned and are allowed to condition their 
choice upon this assignment. 
 
Let us briefly state the notion of ESS that we follow in this paper. Hence, we 
are interested in the evolution and in the stability of both populations, firms 
F and workers W  playing the game. We analyze if small changes in the 
individuals’ behavior from one population imply changes in the behavior of 
the individuals from the other population. 
 
Let 
F p Δ ∈  be the profile distribution of firms’ behavior from population F 
in a given period  0 t , and that in the same period the profile distribution of 
workers’ behavior in population W is  .
W q∈Δ  Assume that in 
0 1 > t t  a small 
mutation affects the workers’ behavior from population W. Hence, the 
profile distribution from population W after the mutation, is given by the 
number of offspring:  
 
                                                 
7 A mutant is an individual who adopts a novel strategy. The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers 
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= ((1 ) qq q ε ε ε −+   (7) 
 
for any     ∆  :        ,  the new distribution  ε q  is called the fitness of the 
post-entry population. Analogously, the profile distribution from population 
F after a small mutation is:  
 
=( 1 ) pp p ε ε ε −+   (8) 
 
for any     ∆  :        .  Now, we can state the following definition: 
 
Definition 1.  Let 
W F q p Δ × Δ ∈
∗ ∗ ) , (  be a profile of mixed strategies. We say 
that the profile  ) , (
∗ ∗ q p  is an ESS for an asymmetric two-population normal 
form game, if for each 
W F q p Δ × Δ ∈ ) , (  there exists ε  such that: 
 
 
for all  , < 0 ε ε ≤  then  p p p ε ε ε + −
∗ ) (1 =  and  =( 1 ) , qq q ε ε ε
∗ −+  hold 
for their respective post-entry populations.  
 
Hence, from the above definition, it follows that if ( )
∗ ∗ q p ,  is an ESS, then, 
the following assertions are verified: 
 
1. The profile  ) , (
* * q p  is a NE. 
 
2. If there exists some 
∗ / Δ ∈ p p p
F = ,  such that  ) / ( = ) / (
∗ ∗ ∗ q p E q p E
F F , 
then  ). / ( > ) / ( q p E q p E
F F ∗  
 
3. If there exists some  ,
W q Δ ∈  
∗ / q q =  such that  ) / ( = ) / (
∗ ∗ ∗ p q E p q E
W W , 
then  ). / ( > ) / ( p q E p q E
W W ∗   
 
So, players who adopt an ESS perform better than the mutants given the 
post-entry population. 
 
In the following sections, we study the dynamic complementarities for both 
types of firms and workers. We consider the workers’ population dynamic to 
characterize the dynamic equilibria and find the threshold value of skilled 
1) ( / ) > ( / ) , =
2) ( / ) > ( / ) : =
FF F
WW W
Epq Ep q p pp







  (9) Ensayos 
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workers and innovative firms required to overcome the low level 
equilibrium. 
 
2.1 Replicator Dynamics by Imitation 
 
The second approach introduced by evolutionary game theory is the 
replicator dynamics. The replicator dynamics explicitly models the process 
by which the frequency of a strategy changes in the population, this allows 
us to study the model’s evolutionary dynamics. In the replicator dynamics, 
individuals imitate strategies of randomly sampled members of the 
population with a probability proportional to the difference in payoffs 
between players, given that the difference is positive. Assuming that 
individuals always imitate better performing agents, otherwise the dynamics 
change. 
 
Consider that during each period  (0, ) t∈ ∞  an agent from each population is 
randomly matched with an agent from the other population to play a bilateral 
finite game. Note that  I y PI I prob = = ) (  is the worker’s probability of 
being hired by an innovative firm, and  = ) (S prob S x  is the firm’s 




i N  be the total of i-strategist,  ( ) ( ) { } NS S NI I i , ; , ∈ , from the population, 
{} W F, ∈ τ , with both populations normalized to 1, that is,  1 = NI I y y +  and 
1 = NS S x x + . 
 



















In the following system, the vectors  ( ) NI I F y y y , =  and  ( ) NS S W x x x , =  are 
distributions of agents playing a certain pure or mixed strategy in the space 
() ( ) {} NS S NI I , ; ,  from the two populations F and W. The expected payoffs 
are defined as:  







() = () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




SN I N I N I
ES yp s C E
EN S yp s
EI x B S B N S s p s p B N S s p C I
EN I x B S B N S s s B N S s
+−
+





2.2 The Specific Imitation Rule 
 
Our imitation rule implies that players stick to a pure strategy for some time 
interval, and occasionally review their strategies, sometimes resulting in a 
change of strategy, early contributions start with Björnerstedt and Weibull 
(1995). Behavioral rules driven by imitation have a long tradition in the 
literature of evolutionary game theory,
8 see Weibull (1995). One of the best 
known evolutionary models, the replicator dynamics, describes an 
evolutionary process driven purely by imitation of other players, which 
corresponds to cultural evolution. In our case the engine of the replicator 
dynamics is the self-improvement of the expected payoffs by imitation of the 
benefits of each economic agent. But we do not assume complete rational 
maximizers, instead agents imitate the most successful behavior of their 
neighbors. But, to imitate their neighbors they do not need to know the 
complete list of states of the world. 
 
In any game with N players, there are N populations; one population for each 
type of player, from which we randomly draw agents who are programmed 
to play some pure strategies available to that type of player. Let these agents 
play the game. Over time, players may change their pure strategy. This is 
embodied by the so-called behavioral rules; such behavioral rules generate a 
system of differential equations that describes the evolution of the relative 
frequency of a pure strategy occurring in a population. 
 
There is one differential equation for each pure strategy available to a 
population and every differential equation describes the evolution of a 
strategy’s population share, that is the number 
τ
i x  for all  N ≤ ≤τ 1  and 
τ n i ≤ ≤ 1 . 
                                                 
8There are two basic elements common to these models. The first is a specification of the 
time rate at which agents in the population review their strategy choice. This rate may 
depend on the current performance of the agent's pure strategy and of other aspects of the 
current population state. The second element is a specification of the choice probabilities 
of a reviewing agent. The probability that an i-strategist will switch to some pure strategy j 
may depend on the current performance of these strategies and other aspects of the current 




Definition 2. A behavioral rule is a map from current aggregate behavior to 
conditional switch rates. The map is given by two basic elements: 
 
1. The time rate  ) (x ri  at which agents review their strategy choice. This 
time rate depends on the performance of the agent’s pure strategy and other 
aspects of the current population state.
9 
 
2. The probability pij(x) that a reviewing  − i strategist will switch to some 
pure strategy j. The vector of this probabilities is written as: 
() ) ( ),..., ( = ) ( 1 x p x p x p ik i i , and it is a distribution on the set of pure 
strategies.  
 
The outflow from club i  in population τ  is  ) ( ) ( x p x r q ij i i
τ τ τ  and the inflow 
is  ), ( ) ( x p x r q ji j j
τ τ τ  where 
τ τ τ
i i x q q =  is the number of i -strategists from 
population τ  and 
τ q  represents the whole population τ, hence  . =
τ τ τ
j i q q q +  
Therefore, given the population τ  and assuming that the size of the 
population τ is constant, by the law of large numbers, we can model these 
processes as a deterministic flow. Rearranging terms, for each pair 
() ( ) , = }, , ; , { , i j NS S NI I j i / ∈  from population }, , { W F ∈ τ  we get the 
following mathematical expression summarized in Definition (2): 
 
=( )( ) ( )( ) i j ji j i ij i x rx px x rx px x
τ τττ ττ τ −    (11) 
 
Consider that an agent’s decision depends upon the expected payoff 
associated with their own behavior, given the composition of the other 
population,
10       ,     and depends on the characteristics of the 
populations represented by  =( , ) .
fW x yx Therefore, we may assume that 
 
( ) ( ) () = , , ii i rx f Ee x x
ττ τ τ −   (12) 
 
                                                 
9This is the "behavioural rule with inertia,” see Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996), Weibull 
(1995) and Schlag (1998; 1999) that allows an agent to reconsider her action with 
probability  (0,1) ∈ r  each round. 
10 Where τ represents the population to which the agent following the i-th behavior 
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where  i e  indicates vectors of pure strategies,  ( ) ( )} , ; , { , NS S NI I j i ∈ , 
independently from population τ , and 
τ − x  is the population state of the 
other population,  τ τ = / − . Functions such as   ) ), , ( ( x x e E f i i
τ τ τ −  can be 
interpreted as the propensity of a member from the i-th type to switch 
membership as a function of the expected utility gains from such a switch. 
Agents with less successful strategies on average review their strategy at a 
higher rate than agents with more successful strategies. 
 
Assume  τ
i f  is population-specific, but the same across all its components 
independent of club membership, and assume, furthermore, that it is linear in 
utility levels, see Weibull (1995). Thus, the propensity to switch behavior 
will be decreasing in the level of utility, i.e., 
 
0,1 ) , ( = )) , ( ( ∈ −
− − τ τ τ τ τ τ τ β α x e E x e E f i i i (13) 
 
where  0 , ≥
τ τ β α  and  ≥ τ
τ
β
α   ) , (
τ τ − x e E i . 
 
To simplify the notation, for each pair  ( ) ( )}, , ; , { , NS S NI I j i ∈  let us label: 
 
•  i i r x r = ) (
τ  and  j j r x r = ) (
τ , 
 
•  ji ji p x p = ) (
τ  and  ij ij p x p = ) (
τ , 
 
•  () i E x e E i = ) , (
τ τ −  and  ( ) j E x e E j = ) , (
τ τ − .  
 
 
From Equations (12) and (13), and after some algebraic manipulation, 
system (11) becomes a replicator dynamic driven by imitation,
11 i.e., 
 
( ) ( )( ) =1 ( ) ( ) x xx E i E j ii i
ττ τ ττ
λα β −+ − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦
 (14) 
 
where  [] 0,1 ∈
τ
i x  and  0 =
τ τ
j i x x   +  for each pair  ( ) ( ) i j NS S NI I j i = }, , ; , { , / ∈  
from population
12
} , { W F ∈ τ , and  ,
| ) ( ) ( |
1
=
j E i E +
λ   0 , ≥
τ τ β α ,  ≥ τ
τ
β
α   ) (⋅ E  
                                                 




Consider that an agent does not know the true values of the expected payoffs 
that other agents receive, but she can take a sample of such true values in 
order to estimate the average. Let  ) ( ~ i E  and  ) ( ~ j E  be the estimators for the 
true values E(i) and E(j),  ( ) ( ) i j NS S NI I j i = }, , ; , { , / ∈ ∀ . 
 
Hence, each  − i strategist changes her current strategy if and only if 
)] ( ~ < ) ( ~ [ j E i E P . A reviewing worker who changes her current strategy must 
take into consideration both: i) a probability of imitating at least one strategy 
that performs better than her current strategy,  )] ( ~ < ) ( ~ [ j E i E P , and ii) the 
probability of meeting an agent, 
τ
j x , who uses such strategy. Consider that 
0] > ) ( ~ ) ( ~ [ i E j E P −  increases proportionally to the true value  ) (j E , we 
therefore obtain the following definition. 
 
Definition 3. A reviewing i -strategist changes to  j  with a probability, 
ij p , 
equals a positive average rule times the probability of encountering a  − j  
strategist in the whole population, i.e.  ( ) ( ) i j NS S NI I j i = }, , ; , { , / ∈ ∀ , 
 
() () > 0
=[( ) ( ) > 0 ] =0( ) 0
Ejx i f Ej j







  (15) 
 
where 
| ) ( ) ( |
1
=
j E i E +
λ  
 
Now, we introduce the behavioral rule from definition (3) and expression 
(15), the substitution of expected payoffs  ) (⋅ E  from system 10, and, after 
some algebraic manipulation from system (14), we get the worker’s 















  (16) 
 
Where the functions  ( ) I S y x A ,  and  ( ) I S y x B ,  depend on shares of firms and 
workers and their payoffs, for the explicit expressions see the Appendix. 
                                                                                                          
12Then, the trajectory  { } t t t x t x t x j i ≤ 0 )), ( ), ( ( = ) (
τ τ τ  is bounded in the unit square 




2.3 Stability and Equilibria Analysis 
 
The RD system, () S I x y   , , admits five stationary states or dynamic equilibria, 











BN S B N S pC I IN I xS




−+ − + −
(17) 
 
In fact, the interesting case occurs when ( ) S I x y ˆ , ˆ  is an equilibrium lying in 
the interior of the square  0,1] [0,1] = × C , which occurs when  1 < ˆ < 0 I y  and
1 < ˆ < 0 S x . 
 
The next proposition summarizes the evolutionary dynamics for the 
replicator dynamics of firms and workers: 
 
Proposition 1. The evolutionary dynamics of firms and workers driven by 
imitation is as follows: 
 
1. Equilibria (1,0)  and (0,1)  are nodal sources and unstable. 
 
2. Equilibria (0,0)  and (1,1)  are asymptotically stable points or nodal 
sinks, and therefore ESS. 
 
3. Equilibrium  () S I x y G ˆ , ˆ =  is a saddle point, and therefore a threshold since 
it separates the basins of attraction of the low-level and high-level equilibria.  
 
Proof. We can assess whether the five equilibria are asymptotically stable 
points by analyzing the Jacobean Matrix  ( ) I S y x J   , , such that, equilibria 
fitting   0 > ) ( det J  and  0 < ) (J tr  are asymptotically stable (see Appendix), 
and then by the Defition (1) they are ESS of the game. There are two 
asymptotically stable strategy profiles. In particular, it is enough to look at 
the phase diagram, Figure 1, where a graphic representation is given.  
 
The point  () S I x y G ˆ , ˆ =  is hypothetically centered but it is not necessarily 




These equilibria can be interpreted as follows: 
 
• Equilibrium (0,0)  is the low-level equilibrium in which firms and 
workers are low-profile ( ) NS NI, . 
 
• Equilibrium (0,1)  and (1,0)  is a mismatch of profiles ( ) S NI, , ( ) NS I, . 
 
• Equilibrium (1,1)  is the high-level equilibrium in which firms and 






Concluding, we can say, first, that players behave rationally, though they 
follow an imitation rule and this may lead the economy to a poverty trap; 
second that there is a threshold value of high-profile agents above which 




3. How to Overcome a Poverty Trap 
 
Since the results of the model depend on initial conditions, that is, the profile 
distributions,  F y  and  W x , the model is historically dependent where an 
optimal strategy of the dynamic replicator system converges towards two 
distinct attractors, (0,0)  and (1,1) . 
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W x x x  the initial 
distributions of firms and workers. Consequently, the following case may 
arise: 
 
1. This consideration can be analyzed as a “game against the field” in which 
there is no specific “opponent” to a given agent and payoffs depend on what 
everyone in the population is doing and the agent is facing the other 
population state. That is, from the side of workers, an individual worker is 
playing against the field represented by the profile distribution of firms and 
workers, this is, the population state. 
 
Hence, let us consider the population of workers. If the fraction of innovative 
firms,  ,
F
I y  is smaller than the threshold value  ˆ ,
F










  (18) 
 
then all potential workers prefer not to become high-skilled, and thus the 





W  in pure 
strategies. Suppose now, that a small part of the non-innovative firms 









I y y' t y < < ) ( 0 , then 
workers prefer to be unskilled and the population of the high-skilled workers 
continues to decrease. In this case a worker will be unskilled. So, we need a 
big change in the distribution of the population of firms to obtain workers to 
become skilled. The threshold value is  , ˆ
F
I y  if the new distribution verifies 




I y y  and therefore the rational imitator worker chooses to be 
skilled.  
 
Now, we define an ESS against the field as follows: 
 
Definition 4. Consider a two population normal form game where each 
population F and W has two possible behaviors. Suppose that the distribution 
of the population F is given by  ). , ( = 2 1 F F F y y y  We say that the the 
strategy   ) , ( = 2 1
∗ ∗ ∗
W W W x x x  is an ESS against the field if there exists an ε  
such that if 
 





W y x E y x E ≥




for all  W W S x ∈  where  . | | ε ≤ −
'
F F y y  Therefore, if the distribution of the 





F y y y  where  F
I
F
I y y ˆ <  then 
(0,1) =
W x  is an ESS against the field.  
 
To overcome a poverty trap requires that we change the rationally 
determined outcome. To do so the economy has to move beyond the 
threshold point of low-skilled workers and non-innovative firms. Focusing 
on workers, a central planner could implement a policy that decreases the 
costs to become high-skilled, or, given the incentive to become an innovative 
firm, to increase rewards to skilled workers. 
 
Therefore, to reverse the inequality (18), and to overcome the poverty trap, 
consider the following: 
 
• Either Costs of Education CE must decrease or the differences in skill 
premia  p p P − Δ =  must increase positively. Consequently, with a 
perturbation  ε σ , workers will become skilled and firms will become 
innovative and both perform better. The economy simultaneously overcomes 
its historical poverty trap. We thus consider the perturbation as a shock that 
compels agents to adopt new strategies, i.e., alternative strategies will invade 
the equilibrium as a consequence of the exogenous shock and, because the 
economy is in the basin of attraction of the higher-level equilibrium, the 
economy will converge to the higher-level equilibrium.  
 
Decreasing  CE means investing in human capital, which implies an 
increasing  . P Δ  In particular, from Equation (17) the threshold  0 = ˆS x  if, 
given the gross benefits of firms, wich are determined in the market,  ) ( j Bi , 
∀  { } NI I i , ∈   { } NS S j , ∈ , then, the premia of unskilled workers is equal to 
, ) ( ) ( = CI S B NS B p I NI − − which means that an innovative firm must offer a 
premium that encourages the unskilled workers to supply their labor or 
become employed in the R&D sector. In turn, due to imitation and to 
strategic complementarities, such an unskilled worker must become a skilled 
worker. This means that workers with better profiles should get the largest 
possible premium,  p . In this way, the number of innovative firms (R&D) 
and the number of skilled workers (human capital) are large enough to 








S y x y x ˆ , ˆ > , . 
 
Any situation in the game against the field can be modified by a central 
planner or policy-maker who is able to change the profile distributions yF 
and  xw. Alternatively, each player who wonders whether their current 
behavior is the optimal response for the long run outcome of the economy The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers 
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could hypothetically participate in collective action to change their profiles. 
Either way, the economy becomes more efficient. The market alone is 
incapable of overcoming this kind of poverty trap. Policy-makers could 
intervene, for instance, by providing some kind of financial incentive for 
R&D investment or by imposing a minimum period of schooling. 
 
3.1. Replicator Dynamic with Fiscal Incentives 
 
Focusing on firms, the central planner could implement a policy that would 
increase the number of innovative firms above the threshold. A policy option 
is to give fiscal incentives to those firms that implement skill premia, which 
can be provided by a well-implemented income tax. 
 
Let us assume that the policy-maker imposes some income taxations at rate 
[] 0,1 ∈ γ  and  [] 0,1 ∈ δ  for firms and workers, respectively. Where means of 
non intervention are denoted as γ = 0 , δ = 0, while means of complete 
intervention are defined as γ = 1 , δ = 1. 
 





i N  be the total of i-strategists,  ( ) ( ) { } NS S NI I i , ; , ∈ , from the 
population  {} W F, ∈ τ , and let  τ
τ i i N H ∑ , =  be the total number of players, 
the whole economy is normalized to 1. 
 
The mass or number of firms and workers that adopt a strategy i,        










































k m R m ∑ + ∈ Δ  the simplex of  k R . In our 




If such taxes are imposed on each population  { } W F, ∈ τ , then the total 
revenue collected in the economy is:  
 
                                                   (22) 
 
The implemented policy is characterized by taxation and subsidies. The 
subsidies are awarded to skilled workers and innovative firms. A proportion 
( ) 0,1 ∈ θ  of the total taxation collected is shared to skilled workers and the 
rest to innovative firms. 
 
The new expected payoff, after transference, for strategist S and NS are 
respectively: 
 
() = () ( 1 )
() = () ( 1)
T
T
E SE S T





  (23) 
 
And for strategist I  and NI  are now respectively 
 
( ) = ( )(1 ) (1 )
( ) = ( )(1 )
T
T
EI E I T





  (24) 
 
So the dynamical system (14), ∀   ( ) ( ) { } NS S NI I j i , ; , , ∈ , is now 
substituted by the new dynamical system given by: 
 
   
       
  1     
                              (25) 
 
Consider that the the initial conditions are:  )) ( ), ( ( = ) ( 0 0 0 t y t x t z I S , then 
the solution of this system will be unique and symbolized by  )) ( , ( 0 0 t z t t ξ . 




) ( = ) (
1











NI E I E
T






From these equations we obtain the threshold value in terms of the share of 
skilled workers and innovative firms, and these values are given by: 
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(27)





     
 
 
Where  I y ˆ  and  S x ˆ  are the former threshold value defined in (17). 
 
So, if the initial value  )) ( ), ( ( = ) ( 0 0 0 t y t x t z I S  in a time  0 =t t  of the 
economy, is below the threshold value  ( ) I S y x G ˆ , ˆ =  then the policy-maker 
needs to implement taxes such that:  
 
                




                                        
 
(28)





     
 
 
and then, the initial conditions are outside of the basin of attraction of the 
low-level equilibrium, corresponding to the system of equations (25). So, the 
economy is increasing to a high-level equilibrium. At the moment where the 
solution of this dynamical system surpasses the threshold value G the policy-
makers may leave the economy evolving by its own rules, i.e, the evolution 
of the economy will be again, determined by the system (14), but now, the 
initial conditions are in the basin of attraction of the high-level equilibrium. 
This means that the policy-makers should withdraw taxation and subsidies 
once the economy, follows a trajectory corresponding to a solution of (25), 
surpasses the level G. After this moment the rationality of the agents will 
drive the economy to a high-level equilibrium. Therefore, the intervention of 
the policy-makers in the economy, in a time t=t0, could be justified for a 
given time period of z(t0) below the threshold value G. 
 
Summarizing, the policy-makers could intervene in the economy to 
implement a tax and subsidy policy such that it encourages workers to 
become skilled and firms to become innovative. The purpose of this policy is 
withdraw the economy from a trajectory converging to an inefficient 
equilibrium (the poverty trap). This intervention of the policy-maker ends in 
the moment where the solution of the dynamical system given by (25) 
)) ( , , ( 0 0 t z t t ξ  surpasses the threshold value G from this moment the 
economy will follow a trajectory, corresponding to a solution of the 
dynamical system (14), of high growth, converging to a high level 
equilibrium, the participation of the social planner in the economy from now 






We presented an evolutionary game characterized by complementarities 
between firms and workers. The model shows that rates of return on R&D 
depend on average human capital, and rates of return on human capital 
depend on aggregate R&D spending. The outcome is a self-confirming 
equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies determined by the steady states 
of the replicator dynamic system. The poverty trap or low-level equilibrium 
is such that in poor economies with a large fraction of low-human-capital 
workers or low-R&D firms, imitation rules can act against sustained growth. 
To achieve economic take-off, a central planner could subsidize the costs of 
education and/or R&D until the economy builds a critical mass of human 
capital and R&D which allows the economy to move beyond the threshold to 
achieve virtuous growth. 
 
The model we presented is practical and/or real, for instance the Bombardier 
Aeronautica Firm in Queretaro, Mexico, is a real approximation of our 
model, where, in an article entitled Mexico’s Jet Set from the Latin Trade 
Magazine,
13 pointed out what we studied: 
 
• Innovative firms: “The levels of technological development of 
manufacturing sector are the strictest worldwide.” 
 
• Imitation: “If we can make this industry grow in our country, other 
industries will follow, and wages will inevitably go up.” 
 
• Skill premia: “You need very disciplined, structured, high-paid employees 
with a lot of experience,” said consultant John F. Walsh, president of the 
Annapolis-based Walsh Aviation. “There are not many places in the world 
that do that. It would be a very big deal.” 
 
• Decreasing the cost of education: “the state government founded Mexico’s 
first aeronautical university next door to the airport.”  
 
Hence, from our model, to overcome a poverty trap is necessary to surpass a 
threshold number of innovative firms and skilled workers. Unskilled workers 
are given an incentive to become skilled when the premia to skilled work 
increases. Hence, firms, in turn, can obtain more benefits being  − I
strategists. If the economy does not surpass this threshold value, a policy-
maker could implement an incentive-based policy to reach the high-level 
equilibrium of innovative firms and skilled workers. For instance, they could 
                                                 
13 See http://latintrade.com/2009/12/mexico%E2%80%99s-jet-set The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers 
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implement a policy to lower the cost of attaining skills. The market alone is 
incapable of overcoming this poverty trap, and policy makers should 
intervene. For instance, policy-makers could provide a tax scheme that 
encourages R&D investment, or they could impose a minimum level of high-
quality education for the whole population. However, the policy-makers’ 
intervention in the economy can finalize from the moment where the 
economy surpasses the threshold value. 
 
Conversely, a poverty trap can arise because agents imitate the best-
responding strategies when the state of the economy lacks both R&D and 
human capital. For low numbers of skilled labor, innovation will not be 
profitable, not just in terms of final output but also in terms of the generated 
rate of technical change. Only after an economy is sufficiently developed in 
terms of its supply and demand for skilled labor, it will undertake R&D. So, 
in this case, one of the main obstacles to overcoming a poverty trap is the 
agents’ rationality by imitation. Using evolutionary game theory to tackle the 
problem of poverty traps, we conclude that a kind of bounded rationality 
characterized by imitation offers a clue to understand the dynamics of 
poverty traps. Boundedly rational agents act to maximize their own payoffs, 
pursuing, as best as they can, their own self-interest. Hence, we have shown 
the strategic foundations of high and low level equilibria when firms and 
workers imitate, and thus they adopt the best strategy given the state of the 
economy. A future research could go in the direction to offer a feasible 
answer about: how much and for how long a government should subsidize 
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1. In particular, if we consider the distribution of workers’ profile, 
() NS S W x x x , = , and firms,  ( ) NI I F y y y , = , then we can model the flow of high-
skilled workers and innovative firms over time:  S x   and  I y  . Since we 
consider large populations, we invoke the law of large numbers and model 
these aggregate stochastic processes as deterministic flows, each flow is 
being set equal to the expected rate of the corresponding Poisson arrival 
process. Hence, rearranging terms, we obtain the system of differential 
equations that characterizes the dynamic flow of workers,  
 
S NS
S SNS S NS NSS NS S
x x







  (29) 
 
and the differential equations that characterize the dynamic flow of firms,  
 
I NI
I INI I NI NII NI I
y y







  (30) 
 
2. The systems of worker’s replicator dynamic (RD)  and firm’s replicator 
dynamic (RD) driven by imitation:  
 
( ) ( ) == 1 SN S SS x xx x A − −⋅    (31) 
 
() ( ) == 1 IN I II yyyy B − −⋅    (32) 
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3. Proof of Proposition 1. The idea is to use the eigenvalues of the Jacobian 
matrix evaluated at a critical point to understand the behavior of the system 
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It can be verified that evaluating such Jacobean to each of the five 
equilibrium points, the equilibria fitting  0 > ) ( det J  and  0 < ) (J tr  are: () 0,0  
and  () 1,1  and then, they are ESS. Moreover, equilibrium  ( ) S I x y G ˆ , ˆ =  fits 
0 < ) ( det J , then it is a saddle point which separates the basin of attractions 
from the low-level to the high-level equilibrium. 
 
 